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In his seminal paper, Rose (2004) concluded from a gravity-type study of bilateral trade that 
the GATT/WTO does not play a strong role in encouraging trade. Rose looks at countries 
where the amount of trade was positive to start with (intensive margin). In this paper, we 
present a corner-solutions version of the gravity model of bilateral trade which explains zero 
trade and leaves room for WTO membership to promote trade at the extensive margin of 
trade. Relying on a Tobit estimation approach, we find that WTO membership has promoted 
world trade to a larger extent than Rose’s results seem to indicate. 
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Becoming a member of the WTO is not just a question of ￿raising one￿ s hand￿ . Ac-
cession is subject to a complex negotiation process, which is costly and which involves
demands from existing member countries that applicant countries do not necessarily
consider to be in their own immediate interest. Perhaps inevitably, bilateral or regional
arrangements may often seem more attractive than WTO membership. The accession
commitments relate to market access, as well as policy rules not directly related to
trade. Both add up to something like a ￿price￿for WTO membership.1 Although
the price-tag is negotiable, the negotiating process is somewhat lopsided in favor of
existing members. Moreover, there is evidence that the price has risen through time;
see Evenett & Primo Braga (2005). Yet, countries are willing to pay this ￿price￿ , so
there must be a bene￿t. Arguably, the most important and immediate bene￿t is an ex-
pected increase in exports to existing member countries, beyond the levels that would
otherwise be reached.
In turn, the ￿price￿that incumbents charge for accepting a new member must be
worth something for them as well. Again, it is the expected rise in exports to new mem-
ber countries. This is in line with what Krugman (1991) has dubbed ￿GATT think￿ ,
essentially a two-sided mercantilist obsession with increasing ones exports. However, it
is enlightened mercantilism in that the principle of reciprocating market access conces-
sions gives indirect leverage to consumer interests (in cheap imports), which would oth-
erwise be victimized in the domestic political process by dominating producer-interests
(in large export market) in both countries. Adding severe restrictions on the use of
export subsidies, a further important cornerstone of ￿GATT think￿ , this enlightened
mercantilism unleashes forces towards freer trade.2 Under reasonable conditions, but
not inevitably, it also leads to more trade.
According to this logic, one would expect that WTO accession boosts bilateral trade
1In the most recent accession (November 2006), Vietnam￿ s commitments run up to almost 700
pages of text related to slashing trade barriers, ending subsidies, ensuring protection of property
rights etc.
2More recently, this logic of the GATT/WTO has been formalized by Bagwell & Staiger (2003).
Throughout this paper, we use the term WTO to mean both the WTO and the GATT. All GATT
agreements were absorbed by the WTO which came into existence in 1995, based on the Uruguay-
round agreement under the GATT.
1between acceding and existing member countries. In particular, WTO membership is
commonly regarded as a key vehicle to integrate less developed countries into the world
trading system, and thus to enhance their growth and development perspectives. Did
the WTO deliver on this account? This question, of course, has many dimensions,
and there is no easy answer. But surely, the GATT/WTO should at least have had
a trade-promoting in￿ uence. Despite the general perception of the GATT and the
WTO as key forces behind the enormous increase in world trade observed after World
War II, identifying a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of WTO membership on the volume
of bilateral trade turns out to be harder than expected. Several approaches have
been pursued in the literature, with varying results.3 Perhaps the most important
and widely recognized study is Rose (2004a) who searches for a signi￿cant e⁄ect of
WTO membership on the level of bilateral trade in a conventional econometric analysis
of a large panel of data covering 50 years and 175 countries, controlling for other
determinants as suggested by the gravity theory of trade. Summarizing an extensive
investigation exploring many perturbations of the data, Rose concludes, at the time,
that ￿we currently do not have strong empirical evidence that the GATT/WTO has
systematically played a strong role in encouraging trade￿ .
Given the aforementioned logic that underlies the GATT, it is not surprising that
Rose￿ s ￿ndings have caught a great deal of attention. They seem to cast doubt on
the GATT/WTO as a ￿success story￿that exempli￿es the virtues of multilateral trade
liberalization. At a time when countries increasingly seem to turn their back on the
multilateral system for the sake of regional trade arrangements, the results must seem
like bad news for those who preach the bene￿ts of multilateralism. However, far-
reaching policy conclusions don￿ t seem warranted. Indeed, it is not even clear whether
we have a puzzle. There are several potential explanations for Rose￿ s results, some of
them perhaps more worrying than others. Hence, we need more research. In a com-
panion paper, Rose (2004b) has shed further light on the issue by examining whether
GATT/WTO member-countries have systematically followed more liberal trade poli-
cies than non-members. And his conclusion, again, is that ￿there is little evidence that
membership in the GATT/WTO has actually liberalized trade policy￿ . This seems like
a consistent explanation of the results in Rose (2004a), but it also seems to make them
more worrying. After all, fostering more liberal trade policies was the GATT￿ s, and
still is the WTO￿ s primary mandate. And the presumption underlying the a-priori
3Brief surveys may be found in Evenett & Gage (2005) and Rose (2006).
2expectation that membership should promote trade is that this mandate has indeed
largely been ful￿lled.
But the message is not as devastating as may appear at ￿rst sight. As Rose (2004b)
himself aptly points out, it is important to be aware of a subtle distinction. It may
be true that, given the existence of the GATT/WTO, member countries do not pur-
sue systematically more liberal trade policies than non-members. But this does not
mean that these policies are less liberal than they would be without the presence of the
GATT/WTO as an institution. We probably don￿ t know enough about the counterfac-
tual to reach a ￿rm conclusion on this latter question. In particular, it would certainly
be strange to argue, on the basis of Rose (2004b), that the world would be a better
place without the GATT/WTO. But still, the ￿policies-explanation￿of Rose (2004a)
that Rose (2004b) apparently o⁄ers seems to raise a somewhat worrying specter.
However, in this paper we do not want to explore any of the issues related to the
￿policies-explanation￿ of Rose (2004a). Instead, we want to go back to the initial
results related to trade as such. It must be pointed out that Rose (2004a) has tried
out a large number of empirical methodologies on di⁄erent partitions of his data set in
order to reach a robust story. He is careful to point out that the data do tell partial
stories where GATT/WTO membership seems to have promoted bilateral trade. But
the evidence in his view does not add up to a convincing story of a systematic overall
positive in￿ uence of membership on trade.4
Several authors have since re-addressed the issue, and have come to di⁄erent con-
clusions. In his summary of ￿what happened afterwards￿ , Rose (2006) identi￿es three
dimensions in which his earlier conclusion might need revision. The ￿rst relates to
￿excessive pooling￿in the country-, time-, or industry-dimension. In our view, the
question here is whether there is enough systematic variation across countries, times,
or industries, that would allow us to come up with a helpful and interesting explana-
tion of why GATT/WTO membership fails to exhibit a systematic in￿ uence in the full
panel. The time-dimension has been explored quite extensively already in Rose (2004a),
and the sector-dimension would seem rather obvious, given the ￿classical￿ GATT-
exemptions for sectors like textiles and agriculture.5 Exploring the country-dimension,
4Rose (2005) compares the GATT/WTO with the IMF and the OECD. Following essentially the
same strategy as in Rose (2004a), he ￿nds that it is even harder to ￿nd such in￿ uence of membership
in the IMF, whereas OECD-membership does seem to have had a positive e⁄ect on bilateral trade.
5Rose (2006) surveys other attempts at disentangling speci￿c time and sector e⁄ects.
3Subramanian and Wei (2006) conclude that GATT/WTO membership promotes trade
mainly, and strongly, for industrial countries, but not for developing countries.6 Inter-
estingly, their explanation partly runs along the aforementioned ￿policies-explanation￿ .
They argue that industrial countries have simply made more out of their GATT/WTO
membership in terms of trade liberalization attempts. A related point is that the
GATT/WTO may have served as a trade-liberalizing catalyst also for countries who
are not (yet) formal members; see Tomz et al. (2005).
The second potential ￿revisionist￿point relates to whether evidence in the time di-
mension should deserve more con￿dence than evidence in the cross-country dimension.
In some sense the point is technical in nature, essentially relying on the presumption
of unobserved country- (or even dyad-) heterogeneity which makes the OLS panel-
estimator biased. In terms of substance, an important dimension of unobserved het-
erogeneity in the usual gravity speci￿cation is, of course, trade policy. In the present
context, it would seem natural to generalize the trade-costs in the ￿multilateral re-
sistance￿terms of the Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) gravity equation. These are
normally motivated by distance related costs, and used to argue for country-speci￿c
￿xed e⁄ects. They might obviously be generalized to also represent trade policies of
the importer- and the exporter-country.
However, in one of his speci￿cations Rose (2004a) did in fact include dyad-speci￿c
￿xed e⁄ects (which nest importer and exporter ￿xed e⁄ects), thus looking only at
￿within variation￿ in the time-dimension. And in these speci￿cations, he did ￿nd
slightly more pro-trade evidence of GATT/WTO membership than in others. But
the estimated coe¢ cient was very small, hence this point o⁄ers very little comfort.
The results obtained by Subramanian & Wei (2006), who also stress the importance
of country-pair ￿xed e⁄ects, thus seem to be due more to the distinction between
developed and developing countries than to the more general country-￿xed e⁄ects. But
there is a question of interpretation that arises in this regard. If the GATT/WTO￿ s
prime mandate is to foster more liberal trade policy, why should we expect to ￿nd
any additional trade-promoting in￿ uence, once we control for trade policies via ￿xed
e⁄ects? To the best of our knowledge, this question has not been addressed so far in
the literature. We address it in the model that we propose below.
The third line of criticism acknowledged by Rose (2006) relates to a potential se-
6Subramanian & Wei (2006) is a shortened version of their NBER working paper of 2003.
4lection bias. By ignoring all country pairs where trade is zero, Rose (2004a) has also
ignored a potentially important trade-promoting in￿ uence of GATT/WTO member-
ship. Members may trade with more countries than non-members, and a country may
experience an increase in the number of trading partners once becoming a member of
the GATT/WTO. This is the so called extensive margin of world trade, as opposed to
the intensive margin relating to how non-zero trade varies across countries and time.
We have argued elsewhere that excluding the extensive margin generates biased es-
timates, and we have included it via Tobit estimation techniques; see Felbermayr &
Kohler (2006). In one of our speci￿cations we have found evidence of a trade-promoting
in￿ uence of GATT/WTO membership.7 In this paper, we intend to undertake a more
comprehensive search for GATT/WTO membership e⁄ects at the extensive margin.8
Indeed, the concluding words by Rose (2006) in his recent survey set the stage for our
analysis. He writes: "I am now persuaded that membership in the GATT/WTO en-
courages the creation of trading links where none might otherwise exist. How important
this is to world trade and welfare is currently unclear to me; I look forward to more
work on this area."
More speci￿cally, the plan of our paper is as follows. In section 2, we ￿rst present a
theoretical model that explains why GATT/WTO membership might play an impor-
tant role at the extensive margin of world trade. The model is close to Helpman et
al. (2006), and it gives rise to what we call a corner solutions approach to the gravity
equation. In section 3, we then show the importance of missing and zero trade data in
the Direction of Trade Statistics (DoTS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
which we use in our subsequent econometric estimation. Section 4 reports a series
of heuristic results on the role of GATT/WTO membership at the extensive margin
that we have extracted from our data, without resorting to the gravity equation. In
section 5, we turn to an econometric analysis of the gravity equation, based on the
corner solutions model of section 2. We ￿rst con￿rm Rose (2004a) in showing that
our data (1965-2004) do not reveal a strong and robust e⁄ect of WTO membership
on the intensive margin of bilateral trade. Subsequently, we put pieces together and
7Our prime interest in that paper was not GATT/WTO membership, but the so-called ￿distance
puzzle￿ . Evidence of a GATT/WTO e⁄ect on the extensive margin was also found by Helpman,
Melitz & Rubinstein (2006) or Liu (2006).
8In the remainder of the paper, when using the term WTO, we refer to the entire history of the
multilateral trading system (GATT plus WTO).
5estimate our corner solutions gravity model. We ￿nd the extensive margin to make a
di⁄erence in two ways. Excluding zero trade observations does, indeed, give rise to a
downward-bias of the relevant WTO-coe¢ cient; and WTO membership does promote
trade at the extensive margin.
2 A simple model of the extensive margin
The standard gravity model of bilateral trade is based on Dixit-Stiglitz-type product
di⁄erentiation and monopolistic competition, whereby researchers normally assume
iceberg-type variable trade costs. These are meant to capture natural barriers to trade,
related to distance and transport, as well as policy-induced barriers such as tari⁄s.
The problem with this model is that it does not allow for zero trade between any two
countries, hence there is no extensive margin. However, the extensive margin becomes
important as soon as there are ￿xed costs of exporting, and if these costs are speci￿c
to the market served. Following Baldwin (1988), we refer to such costs as beachhead
costs.9 Helpman et al. (2006) show that the combination of beachhead costs and ￿rm
level heterogeneity in productivity, combined with cross-country variation in e¢ ciency,
implies that any given country need not serve all foreign markets.
This is a natural point of departure to model the WTO at the extensive margin.
In particular, we argue that ￿other things equal ￿joint WTO membership of the ex-
porter and importer country should lower variable trade costs, as well as the beachhead
costs of exporting. For instance, beachhead costs may be due to a certain likelihood
that a certain destination country disrupts trade, for instance to alleviate perceived
temporary pressure from import competition. Ex ante, an exporting ￿rm may thus
face a higher likelihood of periodic temporary reductions in pro￿ts from exporting to
non-WTO-countries than to a WTO country, provided the exporter country itself is a
member. There are several reasons for this, and we do not go into details here. Suf-
￿ce it to mention the host of rules-related policy commitments entered upon accession
(see Evenett & Primo Braga, 2005), as well as GATT/WTO-type tari⁄-bindings and
9Fixed export costs have become important in the recent extension of the monopolistic competition
model to heterogenous ￿rms; see Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2006). There are other ways
to model the extensive margin, but the beachhead cost model proves convenient for the present
purpose. In Felbermayr & Kohler (2006), we have proposed an argument based on public infrastructure
investment, rather than private costs of exporting.
6the reduction of uncertainty a⁄orded by the WTO rules on safeguard-protection, anti-
dumping-provisions, and trade related intellectual property rights (or property rights
more generally). In an intertemporal model, GATT/WTO membership would thus
a⁄ect the present value of future pro￿ts from exporting. Here, we take a short-cut
and model this as lower beachhead costs in a static monopolistic competition model of
exporting.
Suppose the world consists of C countries, i = 1;:::;C, which di⁄er only with re-
spect to their aggregate e¢ ciency, which we denote by (ci)
￿1. For simplicity, assume
that labor is the only factor of production, and ￿rms produce di⁄erent varieties of a
single good, whereby all consumers have identical Dixit-Stiglitz-type CES preferences,
with ￿ ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿) > 1 describing the elasticity of substitution between any two
(symmetric) varieties. Firms have constant, but di⁄erent marginal labor input require-
ments per unit of output, denoted by a. We assume that a is distributed according
to some cumulative distribution function G(a); which is identical across countries and
has support [aL;aH]. Notice that the variable a relates to the ￿rm￿ s distinct own vari-
ety. We simplify by using a to also index producers and, thus, varieties according to
the Dixit-Stiglitz utility function. Since G(a) is identical across countries, we abstain
from additionally indexing a by the producer-country.
For the sake of simplicity, we abstain from determining entry and exit of ￿rms as
such. We assume a given number of Ni ￿rms in country i, all of which are actively
selling on their home market. We refer to Melitz (2003) for a mechanism determining
the continuous analogue to our Ni. In this mechanism, Ni would be in￿ uenced by
the prospect of exporting through an aggregate zero-pro￿t condition, including pro￿ts
on exporting. Our partial equilibrium model thus squarely focuses on the extensive
margin of exporting.10 In our exposition, we closely follow Helpman (2006).
Denoting the c.i.f.-price for a good of variety k in country j by p
j
k, demand for this
variety may be written as x
j





; where Aj ￿ Y j (P j)
￿￿1 : In this expression,
10It is worth pointing out at this stage that it is beachhead costs, not ￿rm-level heterogeneity, that
give rise to the extensive margin of trade on the country-level, separating positive-trade from zero-
trade partner countries. Firm-level heterogeneity introduces an extensive margin of exporting within
each country, where ￿rms engaged in serving a speci￿c foreign market are separated from those who
don￿ t. While not necessary for the extensive country-margin, assuming ￿rm-level heterogeneity adds
some realism to our model, and it facilitates an easier interpretation against the backdrop of existing
literature.
7Y j is equal to country j￿ s expenditure on goods, and P j is the unit-expenditure func-
tion (or exact price index), depending on prices of all varieties served to market j.11
Since each producer manufactures a unique variety, she has market power. Following
established tradition, we assume that each producer in country i treats P j (i = 1;:::;C)
as given, thus perceiving a price elasticity of demand equal to ￿: Normalizing the wage
to unity, marginal costs of a producer a are equal to cia, and her pro￿t-maximizing
￿ex-factory￿price is equal to cia=￿, where 1=￿ > 1 is the usual markup factor.
Firms in country i who consider to serve consumers in country j must incur ￿xed
beachhead costs equal to cifij; depending on the identity of the exporter (i) and the
importer (j) country.12 Notice that these costs also depend on the exporter country￿ s
aggregate e¢ ciency parameter ci. Besides the beachhead costs, there are variable trade
costs of the usual iceberg type, denoted by ￿ij ￿ 1: Domestic sales do not require any
of these costs, whence ￿ij = 1 and fjj = 0: The pro￿t-maximizing c.i.f.-price in country
j is then equal to cia￿ij=￿.
By assumption, all ￿rms are active on their domestic markets where there are no
trade costs. Additional pro￿ts to be earned by exporting from country i to country j
depend on a ￿rm￿ s e¢ ciency and are given by
￿








where Bj ￿ Aj (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿￿1. Note that from a single ￿rm￿ s perspective Bj is given,
hence pro￿ts are linear in (ci￿ija)
1￿￿, whereby Bj is a measure of the size of the foreign
market j. The marginal ￿rm which just breaks even on exports to foreign market j is












such that all ￿rms with e¢ ciency a > aij would make losses by exporting from country i
to country j: Clearly, this cut-o⁄value is speci￿c to the exporter￿ importer￿ relationship,
11Due to ￿rm-level heterogeneity, this price index depends on the cumulative density function G(a)
and is, therefore, considerably more complex than the standard formulation.
12Notice that in a multi-factor world cross-country variation in ci would also be determined by the
interaction of international factor price di⁄erences and the factor intensity of the beachhead e⁄ort. In
this way, ci could vary across countries even with identical technology. The same applies for marginal
costs of production cia, where the factor intensity of beachhead and production activity could be
allowed to di⁄er. Variations in ci thus allow for both, a Ricardian a Heckscher-Ohlin interpretation.
8and it is increasing in the size of the foreign market Bj. It also increases in the exporting
country i￿ s overall e¢ ciency 1=ci; while falling with higher beachhead costs fij, and
higher variable trade costs ￿ij. All of this is intuitive.
A country-i-￿rm with a < aij will have export sales to country j equal to (cia￿ij=￿)￿













In this expression, the integral is the ￿Melitz-aggregator￿which allows us to describe
aggregate exports in the face of ￿rm-level heterogeneity, given Ni, the exogenous num-
ber of producing ￿rms in country i. Notice, however, that ￿ij is positive only if aij > aL.
It is zero if aij = aL, and negative if aij < aL. Hence, the expected value of exports




￿ij if ￿ij ￿ 0
0 if ￿ij < 0
. (4)
With a constant elasticity of substitution, export revenues and pro￿ts are driven by
the same variables, except for beachhead costs which matter only for pro￿ts. Since
we normally cannot measure beachhead costs, expression (4) can be understood as a
corner solution model; see Felbermayr & Kohler (2006).
It is convenient to de￿ne a function ￿ij(aij) ￿
R aij
aL a1￿￿dG(a). We now assume
this function to be of the same shape for all country-pairs, and we venture the bold
assumption of a log-linear form, so that ln￿ij(aij) ￿ ￿0 + ￿ lnaij. Using (2), we then
have
ln￿
































0 ￿ ￿0 + ln(￿￿￿1AjNi). Notice that ￿ > 1 by assumption.
Figure 1 illustrates the corner-solutions nature of this extensive-margin-model. It
depicts ln￿ij as a linear function of ln￿ij, plotting ￿ln￿ij towards the left. The
dashed parts of the lines ln￿ij indicate the corner solution in line with (4). The
13Obviously, in this model negative exports may not be interpreted as imports.
9underlying assumption is that country j is a WTO member. A ￿within-variation￿at

















, whereby the variable and beachhead cost values marked 1
(0) indicate a situation where country i has (not yet) become a member of the WTO. A
￿within-variation￿at the extensive margin would be observed for some other country
l, starting out from a higher value of real trade costs ￿
lj
0 , where the same beachhead-
cost-reduction from country j joining the WTO alone would su¢ ce to ￿wake up￿a
dormant trading relationship. A ￿between-variation￿at the extensive margin would





0 , but with country k being a member of the GATT/WTO while country l is
not. It is obvious that any such ￿between-variation￿could also be caused by di⁄erences
in overall e¢ ciencies ck and cl.
We shall use this corner-solutions model of bilateral exports, in order to specify
a gravity equation which we then estimate on a panel data set comparable to Rose
(2004a). Details on that speci￿cation, as well as the estimation strategy will follow
below. What we want to do next is provide some descriptive evidence on the importance
of the extensive margin in post-war evolution of world trade, and to investigate by
means of simple heuristic techniques whether GATT/WTO membership appears to
play a role at the extensive margin.
3 Quantifying the extensive margin of trade
To discuss the empirical importance of the extensive margin of world trade, we rely on
the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DoTS) which is a commonly used collection of
yearly export and import data of manufactured goods for a large number of countries.
According to the CIA fact-book, due to de-colonialization and the breakup of the Soviet
Union and other smaller countries, the number of sovereign countries has increased from
67 in 1945 to 192 in 2005. While the entry of new countries into the panel per se is
not a problem in the econometric analysis, it potentially blurs the descriptive analysis
that we are about to undertake now.14 In the descriptive analysis of this section, we
14Whenever new countries are formed, measured world trade increases, simply because trade ￿ ows
that were formerly classi￿ed as internal become external trade. Following Felbermayr & Kohler
(2006), we refer to growth of world trade due to the increase in the number of countries as to the
pseudo-extensive margin.
10therefore focus on a balanced panel of countries by restricting ourselves to a sample
of 104 countries that have consistently been sovereign from 1965 right up to 2004.
This sample contains industrialized countries, as well as developing countries and a
couple of formerly communist countries (such as China or Poland).15 According to the
DoTS, roughly 89% of the 2004 total value of world trade (approximately 841 billion
US dollar) is attributable to country pairs that have existed before 1965, and 11% to
pairs created after 1965.
We de￿ne a trading relationship either as a directed dyad (exports from i to j) or
as undirected dyads (exports in both directions, i.e., from i to j plus j to i). In the
following, we also call an undirected dyad a bilateral trading relationship. In the ￿rst
case we have 104 ￿ 103 = 10;712 country pairs per year, while in the second we have
half that number, i.e., 5;356: Figure 3.1 plots the fraction of directed relationships for
which exports where either positive, zero, or missing. Clearly, the number of export
relationships has increased quite substantially from 1966 to 2004. While in 1966 a
mere 37 percent of all potential trading relationships were active, this number has
gone up to about 80 percent by 2004. In contrast, during the same time span the share
of relationships characterized by missing trade has fallen from about 16 percent to 2
percent, with a major improvement in the data coverage occurring around 1981. Over
the forty years from 1965 to 2004, 7.6 percent of all directed dyads feature missing
trade, 35.4 percent have zero trade, and the remaining 57 percent have strictly positive
trade volumes.
Figure 3.2 decomposes bilateral trading relationships. A bilateral trading relation-
ship is considered active if at least one partner has positive exports. More precisely, let
Iijt = 1 if Xijt > 0 and zero otherwise, and then de￿ne Sijt ￿ Iijt+Ijit. Obviously, Siijt
is zero if there is no trade between countries i and j at time t. It takes the value of 1
if either i has positive exports to j or j has positive exports to i. Finally, becomes 2 if
both countries have positive exports to each other. In ￿gure 3.2 we plot the fraction of
bilateral trading relationships where Iijt = 2 (two-way trade), Iijt = 1 (one-way trade),
Iijt = 0 (zero bilateral trade). Missing refers to the case where Xijt and Xjit are both
missing.
Figure 3.3 gives a rough sense of magnitude regarding the importance of the exten-
sive margin by depicting the cumulative share of trading relationships with di⁄erent
15A complete list of countries is available upon request.
11￿vintage￿ . For instance, the ￿gure shows that the 1965-￿vintage￿of trading relation-
ships (those that had strictly positive trade already in 1965) is responsible for about
85 percent of the 2004 trade volume. In other words, the total contribution of the
extensive margin to 2004 trade over the time span 1965 to 2004 is about 15 percent.
Clearly, as we move towards more recent ￿vintages￿ , the cumulative contribution of
the extensive margin becomes smaller and smaller.16 Overall, ￿gures 3.1 through 3.3
clearly suggest that the extensive margin has played a non-negligible role for the total
growth of world trade from 1966 up to 2004.
4 WTO membership at the extensive margin: heuris-
tic evidence
In this section, we ￿rst explore ￿heuristic evidence￿on WTO membership at the exten-
sive margin of world trade that may be extracted without relying on a fully speci￿ed
corner-solutions gravity-model of trade. We ￿rst take a cross-sectional perspective, and
then turn to the time-series dimension. Table 4.1 runs a multinomial Logit model of
the variable Sijt (de￿ned above) on the two dummies BOTHIN and ONEIN, alongside
common-sense covariates, such as GDPs of both countries, geographical distance, ad-
jacency, common language, and a comprehensive set of time dummies. We take the
zero-trade outcome of Sijt as the benchmark and show coe¢ cients transformed into
marginal e⁄ects at the respective covariate sample means. The results are in line with
expectations. If two countries are simultaneously in the GATT/WTO, the probability
for Sijt = 2 is about 15 percentage points higher than the one for Sijt = 0: The other
covariates similarly take values according to intuition. All coe¢ cients are di⁄erent from
zero at conventional levels of statistical signi￿cance.
Do WTO members systematically have more active trading relationships? Limiting
attention to 110 countries that have been existing since 1965, we ￿nd that the average
number of trading partners has increased from 42 in 1965 to 86 in 2004. Given the
overall number of members at any point in time, the model proposed above would
predict that - ceteris paribus - member countries should have more active trading
16In ￿gure 3.3, whenever a trading relationship featuring missing trade turns positive, this is recorded
as a movement on the extensive margin. This may be misleading, as missing trade need not imply
zero trade. It may also explain the blip in the year of 1978.
12relationships than non-members. As a rough ￿rst check, we run a simple Poisson
regression with ￿xed e⁄ects, explaining the number of trading partners of a country
as a function of its own WTO membership and various country characteristics. We
also include a set of time dummies to capture common time trends. Table 4.2 sets the
Poisson results against a linear model, which we estimate with OLS, and a negative
binomial model augmented by ￿xed e⁄ects. The results support our expectation. The
linear model predicts that joining the WTO increases the expected number of trading
partners by 4.3. The Poisson model implies that WTO members have 12 percent
more trading partners than non-members, while the negative binomial model shows
a smaller e⁄ect of about 9 percent.17 Given that the sample mean of the number of
trading partners is 57, the non-linear results imply that WTO members have between
5.1 and 6.8 more trading partners than non-members. Note that these results are
robust to omitted variables bias to the extent that those are time-invariant.
Countries with more trading relationships need not necessarily have a more diver-
si￿ed trade pattern. We have argued above that trade with a fellow WTO member
country involves a lower risk of unexpected policy interference or enforcement prob-
lems. We have crudely modelled this through country-pair-speci￿c beachhead costs.
However, depending on the underlying correlation structure, ￿rms might also be able
to deal with this type of risk through diversifying their export destinations. As a result,
WTO members would feel less pressure to diversify their trade structure and would
converge to a less diversi￿ed structure of trade which is more in line with the pattern
of comparative advantage. At the same time, if WTO membership goes hand in hand
with decreased trade costs, new trading partners may become attractive destinations,
thus leading to a lower degree of concentration. A priori, the e⁄ect would seem am-
biguous. To obtain a ￿rst rough idea on which of the two e⁄ects was dominant in
post-war development of trade, we compute the Her￿ndahl index of export concen-
tration.18 Figure 4.1 suggests that WTO membership is indeed associated with lower
levels of export concentration.
We run a simple linear regression model to check whether the pattern depicted in
￿gure 4.1 survives conditioning on covariates, such as the country￿ s GDP, its remoteness
17On the di⁄erential interpretation of exponential and negative binomial models, see Wooldridge
(2002, p. 646-653).








13(measured by average distance of country i from its trading partners), total GDP of
the world economy, and the total number of WTO members. Table 4.3 reveals that
WTO membership is associated with a lower degree of concentration. But, though
statistically signi￿cant and robust, the e⁄ect is rather small. WTO members have
a concentration measure which is between 0:012 and 0:015 points lower than that of
non-members. Given that the average degree of concentration is 0:20, the conclusion
is that WTO membership does not make a large di⁄erence across countries for the
destination-country-concentration of exports.
Finally, we turn to the time series dimension, asking whether WTO membership
comes with a higher likelihood for a dormant trading relationship to rise into activity.
Figure 4.2 plots average yearly transition probabilities for WTO members (right-hand
panel labelled 1) and non-members (left-hand panel labelled 0), again looking only
at countries that have existed as sovereign entities throughout the entire period from
1965 to 2004. As a general pattern, the probability that a given zero turns into a
positive trade ￿ ow (marked Pr(￿ 1), lighter shade) has risen through time for both,
member countries and non-members. However, in all periods of time WTO members
have consistently turned zero trade ￿ ows into positive ones with slightly higher prob-
abilities. The opposite pattern obtains when looking at the transition from positive
trade ￿ ows into zeros (marked Pr(￿ 1), darker shade). The associated probabilities
are always lower than the probabilities to transit from inactivity to activity, and lower
for GATT/WTO members than for non-members. However, while the probability has
remained fairly stable for the group of members (right-hand panel), it has fallen for
the group of non-members.
5 WTO membership: an econometric analysis
The heuristic evidence of the preceding section seems to indicate that GATT/WTO
membership matters at the extensive margin of trade creation. However, while we did
include some covariates here and there, we certainly did not control for other determi-
nants of trade in any systematic way. It is worth remembering that Rose (2004a) was
able to estimate a highly signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of GATT/WTO membership ceteris
non paribus, i.e., leaving other factors uncontrolled for in the procedure. The point
was that the e⁄ect has all but vanished, once standard gravity e⁄ects have been allowed
to enter the stage. Of course, there are several ways to bring structural determinants
14of trade into the picture, and any single approach is unlikely to capture them all. But
arguably, the gravity approach is the most convincing one in this context, for at least
two reasons. First, unlike the traditional theory of comparative advantage, it is able
to explain not only a country￿ s global trade, but also its bilateral trade. And secondly,
it has been remarkably successful empirically, consistently throughout several decades
of applied research.
However, although we have alluded to the gravity approach in section 2 above,
equation (6) is not yet a gravity equation, ready for estimation. The variables ci;
￿ij and fij will all be replaced by appropriate proxy variables. This is essentially a
question of data availability and e¢ ciency of estimation; see below. On a conceptual
level, we need to close the model in two di⁄erent ways. First, for the exporter country
i, we must impose a factor market clearing condition which gets rid of Ni for the sake
of country i￿ s GDP and the price and output of its variety. And secondly, we need
to solve for P j the overall price index for the destination country, which is a complex
function of all c.i.f. prices. This introduces a comprehensive interdependency across all
exporter countries￿values for ci; ￿ij and fij (i = 1;:::;C). We refer to Feenstra (2004)
for a convenient summary of how an estimable gravity equation might be derived. The
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where ￿ is a constant, ￿i and ￿j are exporter and importer ￿xed e⁄ects, and uij is an
error term with the conventional properties. The other variables on the right are self-
explanatory dummies, with BOTHINij and ONEINij indicating GATT/WTO mem-
bership and FTAij indicating joint membership in a regional trading block. With the
existence of a time dimension, we need to include time-varying ￿xed e⁄ects ￿i￿￿t and
￿j ￿ vt, as argued by Baltagi, Egger & Pfa⁄ermayr (2003) and Baier & Bergstrand
(2006). This is common practice in lieu of a more satisfactory treatment of ￿mul-
tilateral resistance￿ that Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) have shown to be a key
determinant of bilateral trade in the gravity equation. Inclusion of time-varying ￿xed
e⁄ects takes into account all exporter- or importer-speci￿c determinants of trade, such
as in particular the two country￿ s GDP.19 In this way, all terms appearing in ￿
ij
0 in
equation (6) are eventually covered by ￿xed e⁄ects, while the forces behind ci; ￿ij and
19We alternatively use GDP and time-varying country-speci￿c e⁄ects in our estimations.
15fij are taken up by the usual resistance dummies of the gravity equation (joint FTA
membership, geographical distance, adjacency, and common language), amended by
the WTO dummy which is the prime focus of our analysis.
Equation (7) is not ready for estimation, since it involves latent trade as a dependent
variable. Adding (4) generates a corner-solutions model of bilateral trade. Applying
the logic developed in Wooldridge (2002, p. 524-5), we demonstrate in Felbermayr
and Kohler (2006) that any empirical speci￿cation where the zero trade observations
(and thus corner solutions) are ignored implies an omitted variable bias, leading to in-
consistent estimates of all variables in the model. In particular, an empirical strategy
that draws on non-zero trade data only, as in Rose (2004a), will systematically under-
estimate the e⁄ect of WTO membership on trade. Importantly, even if the extensive
margin as such does not contribute a lot to the growth of world trade, as some of the
￿gures above might suggest, this does not imply that it is irrelevant for estimation:
Estimates based on non-zero trade ￿ ows alone, i.e., the intensive margin estimates,
will be biased downward nonetheless.
In line with the arguments in Felbermayr & Kohler (2006), we estimate our corner-
solutions model employing a Tobit estimation approach. This allows us to disentan-
gle the two margins, which seems important also with respect to the in￿ uence of
GATT/WTO membership on world trade. In particular, writing Z
ij
t for the entire
explanatory variables, the expected value of bilateral exports, conditional on X
ij
t can




























Tobit estimation allows us to present separate marginal coe¢ cients for both terms on
the right-hand side, the ￿rst being the traditional intensive margin, the second being


















Introducing trading arrangements as explanatory variables in (7) raises an endo-
geneity issue, as emphasized by Baier and Bergstrand (2006). They argue that countries
might select endogenously into free trade agreements. Speci￿cally, if countries select
into FTAs because they hope for deeper integration, FTA membership is negatively
correlated with the current level of trade (and hence the error term), as higher current
ine¢ ciencies make FTA membership that more attractive. In that case conventional
estimates of FTA e⁄ects are biased downward. However, that logic is not entirely
16compelling for the case of WTO membership, because it could go the other way round
as well: A country that receives some positive exogenous shock trades more than the
natural level indicated by the gravity equation. That additional trade may make it
more valuable to join the WTO, since transparency and predictability of partners￿
trade policy may now be more valuable. Moreover, the recipe proposed by Baier &
Bergstrand (2006) in order to counter the omitted variables problem, namely the use of
dyadic ￿xed e⁄ects, appears questionable for the WTO context, for the simple reason
that the WTO is a multilateral, not a bilateral system. We follow common practice in
using time-varying ￿xed e⁄ects to capture multilateral trade resistance; see Anderson
& van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004). This also takes care of the unobserved
heterogeneity on the country level that may a⁄ect the decision to join the WTO (such
as positive shocks discussed above).
A few words on the data, before we proceed to the estimation results. We have
clipped the data to the extent necessary in order to obtain a balanced panel. We use the
exporter country GDP-de￿ ator to compute real trade ￿ ows. Real GDP values are taken
from the World Development Indicators. Data on geographical distance, adjacency, and
common language are from CEPII, Paris. The FTA dummy was constructed following
Baier and Bergstrand (2006). The appendix provides the usual summary statistics for
data.
Throughout all our speci￿cations, we use bilateral exports as the dependent vari-
able. Note that the inclusion of ￿xed e⁄ects renders GDP-variables as covariates re-
dundant. We have pursued the following estimation strategy. The ￿rst stage of our
strategy involves looking only at ￿between-evidence￿in cross country estimations for
several sample years with 10-year-intervals. The second stage then moves on to panel
estimates, thus adding the ￿within-perspective￿ . In both stages, we ￿rst look at simple
OLS estimates from country-pairs with positive trade (intensive margin), mainly for
the purpose of comparison with existing literature, in particular Rose (2004a). Subse-
quently, we undertake a Probit estimation for the extensive margin in isolation, and in
a ￿nal step we complete each of the two stages with a joint treatment of the extensive
and intensive margin via Tobit estimation. Table 5.1 presents the cross section results,
while table 5.2 contains panel estimates. In the following discussion we mainly focus
on the e⁄ect of GATT/WTO membership.
Table 5.1 shows our results from stage one, starting in the top panel with evidence
drawn from the intensive margin alone. The estimates of the distance, adjacency
17and common language coe¢ cients, as well as their behavior over time, are closely
in line with existing literature. Our data which extend to very recent periods and
feature a speci￿c sample of countries (balanced panel) thus yield conventional results,
if treated conventionally.20 Turning to GATT/WTO membership, we see that the cross-
sectional variation does not yield robust, meaningful estimates. The point estimates
for the coe¢ cient on BOTHINij (unity if both countries are WTO members, and zero
otherwise), vary between 0.604 and -3.655. They are mostly negative and statistically
insigni￿cant. This mirrors the ￿nding of Rose (2004a). The middle panel reports
￿ndings from a Probit model of the extensive margin, using the same covariates as in
the upper panel. The same message transpires regarding GATT/WTO membership:
The estimates lack robustness and stability over time, with the single exception of year
1995. WTO membership does not appear to be associated with a higher likelihood
that a potential trading relationship is operative.
Finally, the bottom panel of table 5.1 displays results for the cross-section Tobit







, which allows us to continue with a log-log gravity model.21 Except for the
WTO membership variables, the corner-solutions model performs as expected: Relative
to the upper panel, where only non-zero trade observations were used and coe¢ cient
estimates are biased towards zero, all coe¢ cients in the Tobit case are larger in absolute
terms, thus con￿rming the attenuation bias from the omitted variable misspeci￿cation.
As to the WTO membership e⁄ects, we continue to ￿nd estimates that are unstable
quantitatively, and mostly insigni￿cant statistically. The conclusion from the cross
sectional evidence is that there is no evidence for a positive and sizeable WTO e⁄ect
on bilateral trade. In other words, moving from the non-zero trade ￿ ow model of Rose
(2004a) to our corner-solutions model does not help. Estimates are somewhat larger,
but nonetheless statistically insigni￿cant and economically meaningless.
From the previous work brie￿ y surveyed in our introduction, it consistently tran-
20For instance, compare our ￿ndings to Baier and Bergstrand (2006), table 1.
21This is, admittedly, inelegant. However, semilog gravity models tend to perform very poorly. In
Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) we argue that adding constants other than unity to bilateral trade
values does not substantially alter the results. The simple approach of adding one makes the Tobit
model comparable to the conventional non-zero gravity model, an advantage that would be lost if non-
linear methods were used. Liu (2006) follows Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and runs a Poisson
model to account for the extensive margin in a gravity model.
18spires that drawing on time-series variation makes ￿nding robust and meaningful WTO
membership e⁄ects somewhat easier.22 To see if this hold in our case as well, we move
to stage two of our strategy, exploiting the time-series (￿within￿ ) dimension of the data,
jointly with the cross-sectional (￿between￿ ) variation. As regards WTO membership,
we face the di¢ culty of appropriately timing the start of the ￿treatment e⁄ect￿ . Coun-
tries might undertake steps towards trade liberalization in the run-up towards joining
the WTO, and they could be allowed considerable transition periods after joining.23
To avoid these complications, instead of using 40 years of data (from 1965 to 2004),
we use only ￿ve years (1965, 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2004).
Table 5.2 reports our ￿ndings for stage two of our estimation strategy, i.e., panel
regressions. As argued above, consistent estimation of the gravity equation requires in-
clusion of time-varying ￿xed e⁄ects, in addition to a rigorous treatment of the extensive
margin.24 We organize our presentation around the inclusion/exclusion of ￿xed e⁄ects
(FE). The ￿rst three columns exclude all country-￿xed e⁄ects, which corresponds to
the baseline method used by Rose (2004a). Columns (4) through (6) include time-
invariant ￿xed e⁄ects as in Felbermayr and Kohler (2006), and ￿nally, columns (7)
through (9) relate to a model including time-varying country-￿xed e⁄ects.25 This is
consistent with the theoretical requirements of the Anderson & van Wincoop (2003)
gravity model estimated with time-varying data.
Over all speci￿cations, the behavior of estimates other than those for WTO mem-
bership are largely in line with the literature. Column (1) is a variant of Rose￿ s (2004a)
base model, restricted to positive trade ￿ ows (intensive margin only) and estimated
22For a more detailed survey, see Rose (2006).
23It is not uncommon to observe a 10 year time span for accession negotiations; see Evenett & Primo
Braga (2005). It seems plausible to assume that some policy changes are enacted beforehand, in order
to solve the inherent commitment problem. At the same time, it is well known that new members
are sometimes slow in honoring commitments entered during negotiation, China being a prominent
example in this regard.
24In the descriptive analysis, we carefully avoid the pseudo-intensive margin and focus on a balanced
panel of country pairs that have existed from 1965 onwards. In the econometric exercise, for reasons of
comparison, we stick to the same sample of countries. The panel is (potentially) unbalanced, because
for some pairs trade is missing. Availability of GDP data is not an issue whenever we use time-varying
￿xed e⁄ects.
25Fixed e⁄ects always means a dummy for country i as an exporter and a dummy for country j as
an importer, and not dyad-speci￿c dummies.
19over 5 years of data rather than over 50 years. We also use a somewhat shorter list of
covariates, and ￿perhaps most importantly ￿use directed exports, rather than total
bilateral trade as a dependent variable. Rose￿ s main ￿nding are upheld: There is no
e⁄ect of WTO membership on trade. However, looking at the extensive margin with
a Probit model, as in column (2), we do ￿nd a positive e⁄ect, and the same holds for
the Tobit model in column (3). The Probit e⁄ect is fairly small, implying that WTO
membership increases the likelihood of positive trade by 1.1-fold, a mere 10 percent.
However, the Tobit estimate is large: WTO membership increases exports from one
member to the other by 2.5-fold: e0:941 = 2:56, or a 156% increase.
In line with Felbermayr & Kohler (2006), columns (4) to (6) include time-invariant
￿xed e⁄ects for exporter countries i and importer countries j. Focusing on strictly
positive trade ￿ ows, we ￿nd no evidence for an e⁄ect of WTO membership, and the
same holds for the Probit model. But the Tobit model does signal some positive
in￿ uence of WTO membership which is signi￿cant: Joint membership leads to an
increase in bilateral export by about 24 percent (e0:212 = 1:24).
The speci￿cation in columns (7) to (9) is fully consistent with theory and yields con-
sistent estimates for membership e⁄ects. Interestingly, we now ￿nd a positive member-
ship e⁄ect also in the conventional, positive-trade-only regression. The order of magni-
tude ￿a 19 percent increase ￿is similar to that found in frameworks with time-invariant
￿xed e⁄ects in Rose (2004a). The Probit estimate reveals a signi￿cant e⁄ect also at the
extensive margin, albeit very small in magnitude. Finally, the corner-solutions model
implies that joint WTO membership boosts bilateral exports on average by 31 percent
(e0:267 = 1:31).
It is interesting to look at the ONEIN-e⁄ects, although there seems to be a less
clear cut theoretical prediction for these than for the BOTHIN-e⁄ects. Yet, there is
a relatively clear picture that emerges from table 5.2. ONEIN-coe¢ cients tend to be
signi￿cant in the same speci￿cations where BOTHIN is signi￿cant. Moreover, where
signi￿cant at all, the ONEIN-coe¢ cients are both, larger and have lower standard errors
of estimate than the BOTHIN-estimates, the sole exception being the OLS-intensive-
margin with time-varying ￿xed e⁄ects in column (7).
206 Conclusion
Having allowed for the extensive margin of world trade to ￿speak out￿ , can we be
con￿dent that WTO membership is worth its ￿price￿ , more than Rose￿ s (2004a) initial
work seemed to suggest? Can we conclude that ￿GATT think￿has, after all, been
working during adult phases of the GATT/WTO￿ s life? Working in the sense that
countries did reveal more trade, once becoming members, and more trade than countries
outside the GATT/WTO? Or does controlling for gravity determinants of bilateral
trade continue to destroy all evidence that would support the commonly held view
that membership is trade promoting, even if we allow membership to play a role also
at the extensive margin of world trade?
In our view the answer is a ￿quali￿ed yes￿ . Yes, because Probit and Tobit estima-
tions did indeed yield more, and more signi￿cantly positive coe¢ cient estimates for our
BOTHIN-dummies. And the order or magnitude revealed is not negligibly small. But
quali￿ed, because the Probit and Tobit estimates are smaller and less signi￿cant in the
speci￿cation with time-varying country-￿xed-e⁄ects, which is the preferred speci￿ca-
tion on theoretical grounds unrelated to WTO membership. More generally, one would
have wished the e⁄ects to be more robust across di⁄erent ￿xed-e⁄ects-speci￿cations,
or to show up more in the preferred speci￿cation than vice versa. Quali￿ed also be-
cause the ONEIN-e⁄ect which seems much less clear theoretically comes out more
signi￿cantly than the BOTHIN-e⁄ect that we have argued in our own theoretical rea-
soning. And quali￿ed also because the evidence in favor of a WTO membership e⁄ect
seems mainly concentrated in the ￿within-variation￿ . But although one might have
wished the evidence to show up more consistently in both dimensions, here one can
argue to be on the safe side, since there are fundamental theoretical reasons that we
have indicated in the introduction for ￿within-evidence￿to be more trustworthy than
￿between-evidence￿ .
Abstaining from jargon, what is the message that we have for negotiators and
policy makers? It would be silly trying to distill a sharp conclusion regarding practical
problems in accession negotiations and decision making. But, although we do not
feel like having a powerful and convincing ￿revisionist story￿to tell with respect to
the initial ￿ndings in Rose (2004a), we do have some noteworthy evidence to present.
The logic that drives WTO-membership applications and negotiations does, after all,
￿nd some empirical support in a comprehensive statistical analysis of overall world
21trade, support that goes beyond individual success stories or a cleverly chosen subset of
countries. Based on our analysis, countries who are up for membership may be expected
to trade somewhat more with existing member countries, and with more of them, than
would otherwise be the case. The magnitude of the e⁄ect may not be deemed all that
impressive, but it is certainly not negligible either: our preferred estimate lies in the
vicinity of a 30-percent boost of bilateral exports from both countries belonging to
the WTO. Our ￿ndings should also be of some relevance for the broader trade policy
debate. It cannot be denied that preaching the virtue of WTO-type multilateralism
is made somewhat more di¢ cult if we lack clear empirical evidence of membership
e⁄ects, either on policies or on trade. Hence, even a modest correction of the earlier
scepticism should be welcome. And we do feel that a modest correction is warranted
from our results. A corner solutions approach to the gravity equation, which allows for
the WTO to have an in￿ uence on the amount of bilateral trade as well as on whether a
country-pair trades at all, reveals that the low earlier estimates that were based on the
amount of trade alone su⁄er from a downward bias. In addition, the extensive-margin-
variation does suggest that membership plays a non-negligible role in creating trading
relationships between countries that would otherwise not trade with each other at all.
After all, ￿GATT think￿is not entirely unfounded empirically.
We certainly have not had the ￿nal word. Future work should focus on method-
ological re￿nements, such as for instance a more satisfactory treatment of the ￿log-
of-zero-problem￿in the log-linear speci￿cation of the gravity equation, or a sharper
distinction between missing observations and true zeros in the trade data. Related to
this, one might also try to run a genuine sample selection story to the e⁄ect that the
￿rst dollar of trade between any country pair is explained by factors di⁄erent from
those determining the amount of trade in an ongoing trading relationship. It would
also be valuable to incorporate some explicit modelling of negotiations related to WTO
accession, trying to ￿nd out in general terms what makes accession successful (in terms
of ￿GATT think￿ ). A particularly interesting extension of our analysis would be to
explore the interaction between regional trading arrangements and WTO membership.
Do the trade e⁄ects of such arrangements depend on whether or not the participant
countries are also long-standing members of the WTO? For lack of space, we have not
pursued such questions in this paper, but the technique that we have developed here
is readily extended to do so.
In closing, we return to a point that we have argued in our introduction. The
22ultimate cause of the GATT/WTO is not really to promote trade per se, but to free
trade from barriers where these are harmful. In this regard, the verdict cannot be found
by looking at trade ￿ ows; one needs to look at trade policies. And even though there is
some evidence that member countries did not systematically conduct more liberal trade
policies, the rationale of the GATT/WTO as an institution does not strictly hinge on
any such e⁄ect either. Bagwell & Staiger (2003) suggest that the WTO serves a useful
purpose in avoiding welfare costs from ine¢ cient non-cooperative policy equilibria.
Observing that countries who are members of the WTO do not systematically follow
freer (and thus, presumably, less costly) trade policies than non-members, does not
invalidate the Bagwell-Staiger case for the WTO: They might still pursue less costly
policies than would be the case, if the WTO had not been available as an institution.





























Figure 2.1: The  “corner-solutions”  model of bilateral exports 
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Figure 3.1:  Potential export relationships 1966 – 2004 
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Figure 4.2:  Transition probabilities for active/dormant trading relationships   Tables  
 
 
Table 4.1: Existence of trading relationships: Multinomial logit estimates
Zero trade (base outcome), oneway trade, twoway trade 
   Oneway trade  Twoway trade 
Both in GATT/WTO  -0.081  0.153 
 (0.007)  (0.010) 
One in GATT/WTO  -0.083  0.192 
 (0.015)  (0.025) 
ln GDP1  -0.103  0.191 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
ln GDP2  -0.082  0.171 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
ln DIST  0.153  -0.296 
 (0.007)  (0.009) 
Contiguity -0.115  0.193 
 (0.025)  (0.033) 
Common language  -0.064  0.126 
 (0.010)  (0.014) 
Observations 177,186 
Pseudo R2  0.3284 
Log Pseudo-LL  -120,164 
Note: Coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at sample means for dummy 
variables ("BOTHIN" and "ONEIN"), the coefficient relates to the discrete 
change of the dummy from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering 







Table 4.2: Number of trading relationships: Poisson regression (panel estimates) 
   Linear (OLS)  Exponential (Poisson)  Negative binomial 
WTO
i  4.269   0.122   0.090 
   (2.152)*   (0.045)**   (0.045)* 
ln GDP
i  12.336   0.142   0.133 
   (3.404)**   (0.067)*   (0.069) 
Constant -243.422  -0.389  -0.317 
 
 (78.039)**   (1.213)   (1.247) 
Observations   3871   3871   3871 
R-squared   0.56    
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
























Table 4.3: Export concentration as a function of WTO membership 
and other co-vatiates 
WTO -0.014  -0.012  -0.015 
 (0.004)**  (0.004)**  (0.004)** 
ln GDP  -0.020  -0.020  -0.023 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
ln GDP  -  -  -0.045 
 -  -  (0.012)** 
ln (avg. DIST)  -  -  0.034 
 -  -  (0.007)** 
ln (WTO*size)  -  -  0.000 
 
- - (0.000) 
Observations 5080  5080  5080 
Adjusted R-squared  0.12  0.13  0.13 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. Specification (2) contains time fixed effects. All 






















 Table 5.1: Cross sectional estimation of the gravity equation   
Loglinear specification, dependent variable: ln(Xij+1)   
All estimations include exporter- and importer-country fixed effects    
    1965  1975 1985 1995 2004 
  INTENSIVE MARGIN (OLS)     
BOTHIN
ij 0.604 -3.655 -0.673 -1.194 -0.409 
 (0.695)  (0.974)**  (0.672)  (0.705)  (0.421) 
ONEIN
ij 0.499 -3.570 -0.605 -1.755 -0.655 
 (0.700)  (0.990)**  (0.679)  (0.725)*  (0.481) 
Ln DIST
ij -0.751  -1.017 -1.140 -1.394 -1.583 
  (0.035)**  (0.039)** (0.040)** (0.036)** (0.036)** 
ADJ
ij 0.397  0.772 0.676 0.868 0.872 
  (0.117)**  (0.157)** (0.150)** (0.157)** (0.163)** 
LANG
ij 0.645  0.546 0.547 0.817 0.915 
  (0.069)**  (0.081)** (0.079)** (0.072)** (0.072)** 
N  3749  5126 5910 7306 8404 
R
2 0.72  0.70 0.70 0.76 0.72 
RMSE  1.20  1.68 1.76 1.78 2.12 
  EXTENSIVE MARGIN (PROBIT)    
BOTHIN
ij 0.098 0.039  -0.167 0.301  -0.073 
  (0.166)  (0.101) (0.108) (0.081)**  (0.037) 
ONEIN
ij 0.106 0.072  -0.128 0.282  -0.040 
  (0.161)  (0.106) (0.089) (0.106)**  (0.042) 
Ln DIST
ij -0.350  -0.417 -0.330 -0.284 -0.159 
  (0.015)**  (0.016)** (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.009)** 
ADJ
ij 0.419  0.258 0.206 0.094 0.083 
  (0.034)**  (0.037)** (0.027)** (0.030)** (0.015)** 
LANG
ij 0.163  0.210 0.165 0.151 0.078 
  (0.025)**  (0.020)** (0.017)** (0.012)** (0.009)** 
N  8300  8040 9381 8650 7366 
R
2 0.58  0.53 0.54 0.51 0.44 
Pseudo  LL  -2389.04  -2620.71 -2971.84 -2765.88 -2416.11 
  CORNER SOLUTION (TOBIT)     
BOTHIN
ij - 0.173  -2.271  4.090  -1.847 
  -  (1.512) (1.419) (0.994)**  (0.736)* 
ONEIN
ij - 2.040  -0.487  3.459  -1.507 
  -  (1.540) (1.444) (1.042)**  (0.861) 
Ln DIST
ij -  -4.034 -3.587 -3.106 -2.355 
  -  (0.141)** (0.132)** (0.103)** (0.084)** 
ADJ
ij -  1.659 2.171 1.264 1.524 
  -  (0.529)** (0.496)** (0.393)** (0.324)** 
LANG
ij -  3.844 3.459 3.223 2.304 
  -  (0.262)** (0.251)** (0.192)** (0.156)** 
N -  9193  10097  10452  10545 
Pseudo  LL  -  -19596.58 -22430.63 -25489.26 -27381.33 
Note: Standard errors in paranthesis, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the natural log of nominal exports from 
country i to country j. Coefficient estimates for country fixed effects and the constant are not reported for brevity. The number of observations 
used in the Probit model is lower than in the Tobit case (and sometimes even than in the OLS case), because a large number of outcomes is 
perfectly predicted by the fixed effects, so that the associated observations are dropped. The linear probability model, that does not suffer from 
this problem, yields results very similar to the probit case. Table 5.2: Panel estimation of the gravity equation 
      (1)  (2) (3)    (4)  (5) (6)    (7)  (8) (9) 
   E[X|.,X>0] P[X>0|.]  E[X|.]  E[X|.,X>0] P[X>0|.]  E[X|.]  E[X|.,X>0] P[X>0|.]  E[X|.] 
    OLS  PROBIT TOBIT  OLS  PROBIT TOBIT  OLS  PROBIT TOBIT 
BOTHIN
ij   0.065  0.101 0.941   -0.062  0.009 0.212   0.175  0.045 0.267 
   (0.042)  (0.008)** (0.098)**  (0.049) (0.008)  (0.099)*  (0.064)** (0.018)*  (0.110)* 
ONEIN
ij   0.054  0.106 1.671  -0.114  0.008 1.051  0.131  0.062 0.890 
   (0.093)  (0.016)**  (0.209)**  (0.087)  (0.011)  (0.176)**  (0.090)  (0.021)** (0.219)** 
ln real GDP
i   1.165  0.141 2.172  1.542  0.126 2.434  -  -  - 
    (0.009)**  (0.002)** (0.020)**  (0.071)**  (0.009)** (0.126)**  -  -  - 
ln real GDP
j   0.872  0.112 1.662  0.950  0.104 1.929  -  -  - 
    (0.009)**  (0.002)** (0.019)**  (0.050)**  (0.009)** (0.112)**  -  -  - 
Ln DIST
ij   -1.137  -0.203 -2.535  -1.242  -0.193 -2.423  -1.249  -0.320 -2.497 
    (0.026)**  (0.007)** (0.068)**  (0.034)**  (0.007)** (0.084)**  (0.031)**  (0.012)** (0.082)** 
ADJ
ij   0.789  0.100 1.120  0.821  0.111 1.501  0.717  0.188 1.356 
    (0.134)**  (0.034)** (0.417)**  (0.151)**  (0.019)** (0.462)**  (0.143)**  (0.043)** (0.462)** 
LANG
ij   0.543  0.089 1.561  0.771  0.104 2.338  0.742  0.168 2.256 
    (0.054)**  (0.010)** (0.132)**  (0.061)**  (0.007)** (0.138)**  (0.057)**  (0.012)** (0.135)** 
FTA
ij   0.169  -0.028  -0.440 0.189  0.036 -0.326 0.139  0.107 -0.427 
    (0.056)**  (0.016)  (0.136)**  (0.056)**  (0.012)** (0.150)*  (0.059)*  (0.022)** (0.157)** 
Time FE    time fixed effects only  time fixed effects  time fixed effects 
Country FE (time-inv.)  -    country f.e.- time-invariant  - 
Country FE (time-var.)  -      -    country f.e. - time-variant 
N    27801  42932 42658  27801  42542 42658  27801  35576 42658 
R
2   0.64  0.38 0.64  0.71  0,45 0,7  0.74  0.51 0.73 
Note: Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering within groups of country pairs) in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
All specifications (except PROBIT) include constants (not shown), and various fixed effects (not shown).  
Table C.2: Summary Statistics for Table 5.2. 
   Mean Std.  dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Model: OLS (N = 27,801)        
Ln(Exports) 11,13  3,52  -60,31  21,50 
BOTHINij 0,66  0,47  0,00  1,00 
ONEINij 0,96  0,20  0,00  1,00 
ln real GDPj  24,50  2,10  18,61  30,01 
ln real GDPi  24,34  2,16  18,61  30,01 
Ln DISTij  8,58  0,85  4,45  9,89 
Adjacencyij 0,04  0,19  0,00  1,00 
Common languageij  0,20  0,40  0,00  1,00 
Free trade agreementij  0,13  0,34  0,00  1,00 
Model: TOBIT/PROBIT (N = 42,658)        
Relation is active (dummy)  0,65  0,48  0,00  1 
Ln(Exports+1) 7,26  5,99  0,00  21,50 
BOTHINij 0,58  0,49  0,00  1,00 
ONEINij 0,93  0,25  0,00  1,00 
ln real GDPj  23,81  2,15  18,61  30,01 
ln real GDPi  23,81  2,14  18,61  30,01 
Ln DISTij  8,68  0,79  4,45  9,89 
Adjacencyij 0,03  0,16  0,00  1,00 
Common languageij  0,18  0,38  0,00  1,00 
Free trade agreementij  0,10  0,30  0,00  1,00 
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